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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utal1 
TOM:\IIE .\IAURINE BROWN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
vs. 
HAROLD COOK and 
CORA COOK, 
Defendent and Appellar.t. 
Civil 
No. 7959 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
NATURE OF CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff (respondent) upon 
her complaint and a Writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the 
custody of a minor child. Upon failure to present the child in 
court, the defendent Harold Cook was found guilty of contempt. 
A judgment awarding the custody of the child to the plaintiff 
as against the defendants and a judgement of contempt against 
the defendant (appellant) Harold Cook was entered. From 
this judgment the defendant Harold Cook appeals. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The respondent the natural mother of a minor child, Rono 
aid Glen Cook, age 3, brought this action by way of Writ of 
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Habeas Corpus served upon the paternal grandparents, Har-
old Cook and Cora Cook, who at that time were keeping and 
caring for the minor child during the absence of the child's 
father, Glen H. Cook, who was serving in the Armed Forces 
of the United States. The Writ was issued upon the complaint 
and request of the respondent, the plaintiff in the initial action. 
The record shows that the Writ of Habeas Corpus was 
served by the Deputy Sheriff of Uintah County on the 1st day 
of December, 1952, wherein the appellant and defendant~ 
(hereinafter to be known as the defendants) were ordered to 
bring the person of Ronald Glen Cook, the minor child, beforE"-
the court on the 9th day of December, 1952, to be dealt with 
according to law. The complaint prayed for an award of cus-
tody to the mother. The record indicates that, following the 
service of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the grandparents, the 
defendants, contacted the father of the child, Glen H. Cook, 
and informed him of the nature of the action and that they 
were ordered by Writ of Habaes Corpus to bring the child to 
court and that the question of the child's custody would there 
be dealt with. Some time in the evening of the 8th day of 
December, 1952, the natural father of the child, Glen H. Cook. 
returned to the home of one of his sisters, where the defend· 
ants were with the child, took the child and left and did not 
return. The defendants were thus unable to be present in 
court with the child as ordered. This inability resulted in .. 
judgment of contempt against the defendant Harold Cook. 
The defendant, Harold Cook, the grandfather, was the 
only one to take the stand, and he testified that the father of 
the child came and took the child while he and his wife were 
at the home of their daughter, that the child was taken by his 
natural father to his own home. When the defendants returned, 
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they found the infant's clothing gone, but the car belonging to 
the father of the child was left at the home of the defendants. 
The father of the child was never made a party to this ac-
tion, nor was any attempt made to serve him either by personal 
sen·ice or by publication. The record shows that the plaintiff 
obtained a divorce from the child's father some time in June of 
1952 and that she remarried immediately thereafter. These 
divorce proceedings were first instituted in January of 1952. 
After the plaintiff filed action for divorce, she admitted that 
she had never attempted to get the custody of the child from 
the farther ( R. 29). 
Only the plaintiff and the defendant Harold Cook testi-
fied. The record shows that the court, upon hearing the evi-
dence adduced, found the defendant Harold Cook guilty of 
contempt and ordered him to pay a fine of $150.00 . and 
sentenced him to be confined in the county jail for a period 
of 30 days. No affidavit was filed formally charging the de-
endant with contempt of court. 
The execution of the sentence imposed for contempt w~s 
suspended for a period of 10 days, in which the court directed 
the defendant to obtain the child from the natural father and 
tum him over to the natural mother either in Utah or in North 
Dakota and take a receipt for said child. If this was complied 
with, the jail sentence together with $100.00 of the fine would 
be suspended, and the defendant would be required to pay 
only the sum of $50.00. The Findings of Fact filed and signed 
found the plaintiff was the mother of the infant, age 3, aad that 
the defendants were his paternal grandparents; that the natural 
father had left the child with his parents (defendants) during 
his absence in the Armed Forces of the United States; that 
plaintiff had obtained a divorce from the natural father of the 
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child and remarried within a few days thereafter but that such 
action did not disqualify her to her rights of custody to the 
minor child; that the plaintiff as the natural mother was awarded 
the custody as against the defendants. A decree was accordinly 
entered awarding plaintiff custody as against the defendants 
grandparents of the minor child. No determination was made 
as between the rights of the natural mother (the plaintiff) and 
the father (who was not made a party to the action) to the 
custody of the child. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The defendant Harold Cook assigns the following errors 
upon which he relies for reversal of the decree and judgment 
appealed from and for an order of this court directing the trial 
court to make and enter judgment of dismissal of this matter. 
1. The trial court erred in awarding the custody of the 
child to his natural mother, the plaintiff, since the child was out 
of the court's jurisdiction and was never before the court for the 
court to determine such custody as between the mother and 
any persons. 
2. The court erred in holding the defendant Harold Cook 
in contempt without the filing of an affidavit as required by tbP. 
provisions 78-32-3 ( 104-45-3). 
3. The court erred in finding the defendant guilty of con-
tempt since there is no evidence in the record to sustain or sup-
po~ such a finding. 
4. The court erred in holding the defendant guilty of con-
tempt on the basis that the defendant did not notify the Sheriff 
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of the father's retun1 or his counsel or counsel for the plaintif 
(R. ·H). 
5. The court erred in holding that the defendant permitted 
the natural father of the child to take the infant in question 
( R. 42) and that such was a violation of the order of the court. 
The e\·idence in the record fails to show that the defendants 
were eYer in a position to refuse the natural father of thP. 
child his right to the control and custody of the infant. 
6. The court erred in holding that the defendant could 
purge himself of the jail sentence and $100.00 of the $150.00 
fine imposed by obtaining the custody of the child and trans-
ferring the same to the natural mother either in Vernal or in 
North Dakota. By so doing the court in effect determined 
that the plaintiff was entitled to custody of the child as 
against the natural father of the child, who is not made a party 
to the action, and was an attempt to coerce the natural father 
into the delivery of the custody of the child without due pro 
cess of law and the opportunity to be heard. 
7 .. The court erred in holding the defendant Harold Cook 
in contempt and imposing judgment and fine on him on tht> 
ground that he was not given the opportunity to answer and 
present evidence as required by 78-32-9, ( 104-45-9). 
8. The court lacked jurisdiction to sentence the defendant 
for contempt on the ground that no findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law were made or entered by the court and the same 
were not waived by the defendant. 
9. The court erred in imposing punishment without notice 
of the charge of contempt as required by law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THAT TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO ITS NATURAL 
MOTHER, SINCE THE CHILD WAS OUT OF THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT. 
The record shows that the infant, Ronald Glen Cook 
was never before the court, and there is no showing in the 
record that the court acquired jurisdiction of his person. The 
court held ( R. 42) that the natural father had taken the child 
out of the court's jurisdiction. The attention of the court is 
particularly called to the wording of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
served upon the defendants wherein they were commanded 
" ... to appear before the Judge of the above entitled court 
on the 9th day of December, 1952, at the courtroom in the 
County Courthouse at Vernal, Utah, at the hour of 10:00 o'clock 
A.M., and to bring with you the person of Ronald Glen Cook, 
then and there to be dealt with according to law." The word-
ing indicates that the jurisdiction of the infant was to be ob-
tained upon his being presented in court. The authorities art> 
in accordance that the jurisdiction of the courts of the state 
to regulate the custody of the infant does not depend upon 
the domicile of the parent but upon the residence of the child. 
This ruling is followed in cases where divorces are granted in 
states other than where the children reside. As an example of 
this, the record shows that the plaintiff obtained a divorce in 
the state of Wyoming but that custody was not awarded be-
cause the child was not there. The record shows that the child 
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was not in the court's jurisdiction and was probably out of the 
state of Utah at the time the court heard the matter (R. 43). 
No proceeding had been instituted against the father of the 
child, who had his custody, to place the child before the court 
to be dealt with according to law. (See Sheehy vs. Sheehy, 88 
N.H. 223, 107 ALR 635; also Finlay vs. Finlay-New York 
Case-148 NE 624, 40 ALR 937). 
POINT 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DE-
FENDANT HAROLD COOK IN CONTEMPT 
WITHOUT THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT AS 
REQUIRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF 78-32-3 
( 104-45-3). 
The provisions of the applicable statute, 78-32-3, ( 104-
45-3), require the issuance of an affidavit to be presented to 
the court when the alleged contempt is not committed in its 
prsence. The law recognizes two distinct types of contempt-
direct and constructive. The direct contempts are those mat-
ters of contemptuous condut or those which tend to impugn 
the dignity of the court which are committed in its presence or 
in the presence of the judge while at chambers. A direct con-
tempt consists of words spoken or acts committed in the pres-
ence of the court or during its intermissions which tend to sub-
vert, embarrass or prevent justice. These are acts which the 
court can see and take cognizance of itself and which it need 
not be advised of by third parties. Indirect or constructive con-
tempts are those actions committed not in the presence of the 
court but at a distance from it which tend to degrade the court 
or obstruct, interrupt or prevent or embarrass the administra-
tion of justice. 12 Am. Jur. 390-392. 
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The statute above referred to reads as follows: 
"\Vhen a contempt is committed in the immediate 
view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers. it 
may be punished summarily, for which an order must be 
made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate 
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded 
against h thereby guilty of a contempt, and that he be 
punished as prescribed in section 78-32-10 hereof. When 
the contempt is not committed in the immediate view 
and presBnce of the court or judge at chambers, an af-
fidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the 
facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the 
facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial of-
ficers." (Italics mine) 
This matter was thoroughly discussed in the case of Rob-
inson vs. City Court for Ogden, Weber County, et al, 112 U. 36, 
185 P. (2d) 256, wherein the petitioner made a remark on or 
about the time he entered an elevator in the presence of the 
judge relative to the court being a ''kangaroo court." The 
judge immediately took Robinson to the court and there im-
posed a judgment upon him for contempt, which was brought 
before this court on a Writ of Prohibition. It was held that 
the objectionable remark was not in the presence of the court 
or the judge at chambers. The court there held: 
"It is necessary, in all proceedings for contempt 
which are not committed in the presence of the court, 
in oroer to give the court jurisdiction, that an affida_vit 
or affidavits be presented to the court stating the facts 
constituting contempt. Young v. Cannon, 2 Utah 560; 
Crowther et al., vs. District Court of Salt Lake County, 
93 Utah 586, 45 P .(2d) 243; Jones v. Cox, 84 Utah 568 
37 P. ( 2d) 777. A contempt proceeding is separate and 
apart from the principle action and in order for the court 
to acquire jurisdiction of the offense when committed. as 
here, it is necessary that an affidavit or initiating plead-
ing filed. Unless this is done, subsequent pt'Oceedings 
are palpably null and void... (Italics mine) 
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This case also holds the affidavit takes the place of the 
complaint, and, whether the contempt be regarded as civil or 
criminal when not committed in the presence of the court or 
the judge in his chambers, the court is without jurisdiction to 
proceed until a pleading of some nature has been served on 
the accused and filed with the court. One of the purposes for 
an affidavit is to advise the defendant of the particular facts 
of which he is accused so that he may properly defend against 
the charge or offer such extenuating and justifiable circum-
stances as the facts may warrant. supra. Such right is a right 
of due process guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, Section 12, Article I. 
The above cited case emphasized very well the necessity 
for an affidavit in cases of this type where the contempt is not 
committed in the presence of the court prior to the court's ob-
taining jurisdiction thereof. The following from the opinion is 
quoted: 
.. Not having been informed against, there would be 
no pleading in the district court and no way for the pe-
titioner to legally know the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation against him. One might as well say that the 
court could, from the benc,h, inform a person he was 
guilty of burglary and sentence him to jail. In both 
instances the accused has been told the nature of the 
offense but not in the manner or the way required by 
the constitution and statutes of this state. Section 12, 
Article I, of the Constitution of the State of Utah gives 
to an accused in a criminal action the right to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against )lim 
and to have a copy thereof. Section 104-45-3 (78-32-3 ), 
U.C.A., grants this same right to an accused in contempt 
proceedings when committed as in this proceeding." 
Thus, the lack of an affidavit as contemplated by statute purged 
the trial court of any jurisdiction in its judgment of contempt 
and constitutes a reversible error. 
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POINT 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE DEFEND-
ANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT SINCE THERE IS 
NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUSTAIN 
OH SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING. 
It is a general rule that the evidence required prior to 
a conviction or a judgment in cases of criminal contempt must 
be beyond all reasonable doubt; that is, the degree of proof 
upon which the judgment or conviction is founded must be 
beyond all reasonable doubt. In other cases the courts make a 
requirement that the evidence upon which a conviction for 
contempt is sustained ~hall be by clear and convincing proof, 
which is regarded by most courts as more than a mere pre-
ponderence of the evidence. In many jurisdictions in which the 
violation of a civil injunction is considered crminal in its nature, 
mere preponderance of the evidence is insuffcent to support a 
convction. 12 Am. Jr. 44-2. 29 ALR 127. 49 ALR 978. 
This court has held that, though sufficient facts might ap-
pear in the evidence upon which the court might sustain a 
conviction of contempt, this is nevertheless not sufficient. The 
court is required to investigate the charge against the accused: 
and the accused cannot be held guilty without a hearing, evi-
dence and proof, Herald Republican Pub. Co. vs. Lewis, 42 
U. 188, 129 U624. In the case above cited, it was held that. 
before a conviction could be had, the guilt of the accused must 
be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. A mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence not being enough. 
The record fails to show anywhere a contumacious or wil-
ful attitude on the part of the defendant Harold Cook to vio-
late the order of the court. The defendant informed the father 
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of the child that he as under order to present the boy in court 
on the prescribed date prior to the father's taking the child with 
him. The record fails to show any cooperation on the part of 
the defendant with any person in the removal of the child. 
The record indicates that the father of the child did not 
specifically state when he was going nor where he was going 
with the child but stated mere]y, "I ain't going to stay here. 
I'm going to take him and go." ( R. 31). On cross examination, 
the record shows the defendant told the father of the child 
that he was under order to have the child in court on the 
designated date. ( R 33). The record shows that, after service 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the defendant contacted his 
son in California and advised him of the nature of the pro-
ceeding ( R. 32 ) . The record shows that the father advised the 
defendant that he had had legal advice in the army ( R. 35); 
and that, after being so advised, the defendant let the father 
take the boy. From the above there is no indication that the 
defendant committed a contempt in his violation of the order. 
Further, it is required as a matter of law, before a person 
can be found guilty of contempt, that he must have the ability 
to perform the act required. Thus, it is held in the case of 
Limb vs. Limb, 113 U. 385, 195 P. (2d) 263, that a person who 
puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with the court 
order and is still unable to do so is not guilty of contempt on 
account of such failure. In the case of Foreman vs. Foreman, 
111 U. 72, 176 P. (2d) 144. this court held that, before a 
court is justified in awarding damages in a contempt pro-
ceeding, the court must consider the ability of the party 
charged with contempt to perform. In Hillyard vs. District 
Court of Cache County, 68 U. 220, 249 P 806, this court held: 
"Under the authorities cited and the uniform hold-
ings of the courts, it is a prerequisite in contempt pro-
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ceedings of the nature here under review to an order 
committing to jail that the one charged should be 
found able to comply with the court's order or that he 
had intentionally deprived himself of the ability to com-
ply with such order. The court did not make such- a 
finding. The language of section 6829, supra, seems to be 
mandatory that findings are necessary to support a 
judgment in actions in which the court is required to 
make findings unless such findings are waived." 
Thus, in the instant case, there must be ~vidence to show that 
the defendant, by his acts, deprived himself of the ability to 
perform the order of the court. This is not borne out by the 
evidence before the court. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DEFEN-
DANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT ON THE BASIS 
THAT THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO NOTIFY 
THE SHERIFF, HIS COUNSEL OR COUNSEL FOR 
PLAINTIFF OF THE FATHER'S RETURN. 
The defendant was charged with contempt, as far 
as can be determined from the record for permitting the 
child's father to take the child and on the basis that he failed 
to inform his counsel, the Sheriff, or counsel for the plaintiff 
of the father's returning and taking the child with him. It is 
axiomatic that one cannot be placed under obligation by indi-
rect means to the court. Had the court through some process 
made the defendant the child's keeper and charged him with 
the well-being and safety of the child in question subsequent to 
the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and prior to 
the hearing by some proper proceeding, there may then have 
been some ground for the contention that the defendant vio-
lated a trust in not notifying the Sheriff or the court or some 
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other individuals of the father's taking the child. However. 
nothing contained in the Writ places upon the defendants any 
compuJsion or obligation relative to the court other than that 
directly recited therein. The defendants were not the sheriff~ 
nor were they officers of the court. They were merely individ-
uals who were striving to the best of their ability to care for 
and protect their grandchild for a temporary and indefinite 
period of time, and the discharge of any such voluntary oh-
ligation did not or could not carry with it any obligations to 
the court upon which the court could hold the defendant in 
contempt. Such failure on the part of the defendant to imme-· 
diately inform his counsel or other authorities as indicated by 
the trial court may have been imprudent, but it was certainly 
not contemptuous when one considers that the objectionable 
act or acts occured in the wintertime, in the afternoon or eve-
ning and in a rural area, to-wit, Davis Ward (rural area 6If:1 
miles southeast from V emal). The record shows that early the 
next morning counsel for the defendant was notified and that 
immediately after notification counsel for the plaintiff was 
contacted and so informed of the removal of the child. 
It is noted that there is contention made by the plaintiff 
that the defendant, by notifying the father by telephone or 
other co:rm:nunication, was in violation of the spirit of the 
Habeas Corpus. The record fails to show that the plaintiff at 
any time sought to make the natural father a party to any 
action 1concerning the custody of the infant. The record 
fails to show any effort on the part of the plaintiff or her 
counsel or any attempt by them to communicate with the 
natural father of the child. No service was ever sought upon the 
natural father by the plaintiff, and the record seems to indicate 
that this action was merely an abortive attempt on the part of 
the plaintiff to acquire the custody of the child in the ah-
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sence of his natural father without affording him any oppor· 
tunity to be heard or to testify relative to any right that he 
might have which may have been paramount to the right of the 
plaintiff to said custody. 
POINT 5. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT PERMITTED THE NATURAL 
FATHER OF THE CHILD TO TAKE THE INFANT 
IN QUESTION AND THAT SUCH WAS A VIOLA-
TION OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT. 
As a matter of law, it is held, where there is no ad-
judication to the rights of children, it is prima facie that thP 
parents have equal rights to the custody and control of their 
children. The common law rule is that the father has a para-
mount right to the custody of his children; however, this has 
been modified by statutes and recent holdings and particularly 
by our courts, which give the parents equal right to the cus-
tody and control of the children where there is no adjudication 
otherwise. In the case of Sherry vs. Doyle, 68 U. 7 4, 249 P 
250. 48 ALR 131, this court has sustained the paramount right 
of the father to the care, custody and control of his children. The 
facts of that case are similar to those invovled here in that 
the child had been left by its parent with the defendants Doyle 
while he worked at various places, the child being about 4 
years of age at the time of the action. Upon refusal to deliVf~r 
the custody of the child, which had been turned over to the 
Doyles under contract for care and keeping thereof, the father 
obtained a Writ of Habeas Corpus; and the court sustained his 
right to the custody of the child as against the Doyles. The 
father at that time had no home, but the court held that any 
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right the defendants might have must yield to that of the 
father. Thus, by analogy, we find that the father in this par-
ticular case had a paramount right to the care, custody and 
control of his child and that the defandants were in no legal 
position to forbid him that right or refuse to permit the child 
to accompany its natural father wherever he chose to take it. 
It should be borne in mind that the litigation here in the 
instant case does not concern the right of custody between the 
natural parents of the child, but merely whether or not, by vir-
tue of the i;)suance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the defendant 
(not one of the natural parents) could deny the natural parent 
the right to the custody and control of the child, particularly 
where such custody and control had been, during the latter 
months of the marriage of the plaintiff and the child's father 
and subsequent to the divorce, continuously with the natural 
father of the child. 
POINT 6. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
DEFENDANT COULD PURGE HIMSELF OF THE 
JAIL SENTENCE AND $100 OF THE $150 FINE 
IMPOSED BY OBTAINING THE INFANT CHILD 
AND DELIVERING ITS CUSTODY TO THE 
CHILD'S NATURAL MOTHER. 
The courts uniformly hold as a matter of law that parents 
shall be entitled to the care, custody and control of their chil-
dren and that they may not be deprived of the same without 
due process of law, which presupposes that notice and hear-
ing will be had prior to the depriving the parents, or either 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
of them, of the custody of their children. The holding in the 
present case ( R. 43) that 
"the court therefore is going to suspend, and its is ordered 
that the execution upon this judgment of contempt be 
suspended, for a period of ten days, all of it, and at the 
end of that time it will be further suspended upon the 
condition that the defendant or the natural father de-
liver:; the custody of this child to the natural mother in 
accordance with her odrer, whether that is at her home 
in Taigo, North Dakota, or here, as it may be most 
desirable for her, and taking a receipt from the natural 
mother for the child and filing that receipt with the 
clerk of this court. If that is done, all except the $50.00 
of the judgment-the jail sentence and the bal~ce of 
the fine, all but the $50.00 fine-will be suspended." 
indicates that the court by such judgment attempted to award 
the custody of the minor child to his natural mother without 
giving the natural father of the child an opportunity to be 
heard. This was sought to be done by coercion in that the 
natural father would surrender his child rather than see his 
father go to jail and pay the fine imposed. This is home out by 
the record ( R. 43) where the court states: 
"and I have no reason to believe that the natural father 
won't consider this situation that, the court feels, he has 
helped to impose upon his father as being rather serious 
and that he will not be pleased at all with this judgment." 
Also: " ... the Court feels that there will be some cooper-
ation-and I hope that there will be-by the natural father, 
who is not before this Court, and has not been served 
with any process, and that he will be glad as soon as he 
knows what the lay of this case is, to cooperate with the 
Court, and with these good people, to get the child to its 
proper custodian in accordance with the judgment and 
finding of the Court." 
The above, in the face of no attempt on the part of tlw 
plaintiff to contact the natural father of the child or to make 
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him a party to the action. constitutes reversible error insofar 
as it is an attempt to obtain an objective by circuity without 
affording the pa1ty directly connected therewith a full op-
portunity to be heard. 
The natural father of the child was not before the court, 
nor was he served with any process, nor at any time has the 
court denied him, by implication or otherwise, the custody or the 
right of custody to his child. His taking of the child could 
under no stretch of imagination constitute a violation of any 
order of the court since he, as the natural father, being not 
deprived of its custody, would be entitled thereto. (See Sherry 
r.:s. Doyle~ supra. ) 
The record indicates that in December of 1951 the plain-
tiff left the infant child with his father and went to Wyoming 
and that plaintiff had not had the child with her since July, 
1951, except for a short period of time in November and 
December, 1951, ( R. 4, 14, 16); that thereafter she, accord-
ing to her testimony sought to have the custody of the child. 
The extent of her efforts was to write to her husband. In 
January of 1952, she filed an action for divorce in the state 
of Wyoming. The divorce was granted in June of the same 
year. The plaintiff testified that at no time after the filirig of 
the divorce did she attempt to obtain the custody of her child 
( R. 28-29). Immediately after her divorce, she was remar-
ried and admitted that no attempt was made by her to ob-
tain the custody of the child until immediately prior to the 
filing of this action ( R. 23-24). The actions of the plaintiff, 
the natural mother of the child in this respect, by abandoning 
the infant with his natural father, without inquiries relative to 
his whereabout or an attempt to obtain his custody for a period 
from about August 1951, till November of 1952 casts grave 
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question upon any presupposed paramount right that she, as 
the natural mother of the child, might have to his custody or 
control over that of his natural father. 
Thus, we see that the error above noted was an attempt 
by the court to give the custody of the infant child to his nat-
ural mother, to whom any paramount right of custody can 
well be considered to have been forfeited, and this through co-
ercion upon the only parties before the court upon whom the 
court might use force to bring about such ends. 
POINT 7. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DE-
FENDANT HAROLD COOK IN CONTEMPT AND 
IMPOSING JUDGMENT AND FINE ON HIM ON 
THE GROUND THAT HE WAS NOT GIVEN THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER AND PRESENT EVI-
DEN(;E AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
The provisions of 78-32-9 ( 104-45-9) provides as follows: 
.. When the person arrested has been brought up or 
has appeared the court or judge must proceed to investi-
gate the charge, and must hear any answer which the 
person arrested may make to the same, and may exam-
ine witnesses for or against him; for which an adjuo!'n-
ment may be had from time to time, if necessary." 
In the case of Foreman vs. Foreman (citing other cases), 
supra, in discussing the distinction between civil and crim-
inal contempt, this court held if the contempt proceeding was 
merely one of fine and/ or imprisonment, then it is criminal 
in nature; thus, the instant case is one of criminal contempt 
falling within the scope of the above statute. 
In the case at issue, the defendant had no notice of any 
charge of contempt; no affidavit was filed formally charging 
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him with contempt as required; and no hearing was held. The 
defendant was found guilty by the court without having any 
opportunity to present evidence or to subpoena witnesses in 
bis behalf or to deny the charges placed against him. This 
case is analogous to the case of Robinson vs. City Court for the 
City of Ogden, supra, wherein it was held that Section 12 of 
Articie I of the Constitution provided that in cases of this kind 
the accused has a right to demand the nature of the cause 
of the accusation against him and have a copy thereof. It was 
also held that the same right is given to one accused of 
criminal contempt when the alleged contempt is not com-
mitted in the presence of the court or judge in chambers. 
It further held that the accused is entitled to be informed 
of the charge against him, to be permitted to plead to the 
charge, to be represented by counsel of his own choosing and 
to be afforded the right and opportunity to be heard. 
In the case of Herald-Republican Pub. Co. vs. Lewis, 
supra, this court held that the above statute does not con-
template the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings as 
in civil cases. The court «must hear any answer« in pro-
ceeding to investigate, and nothing short of a plea of ·guilty 
or its equivalent will justify a judgment of conviction without 
evidence, and without an investigation of the charge. If further 
holds that a recital in a judgment of conviction for contempt 
not committed in the court's presence that «the matter is sub-
mitted upon its merits upon affidavit and the answers,'~ etc. 
does not show a waiver of a trial or a hearing, or a consent· to 
render final judgment in the cause on the pleadings and 
without trial. It is also noted that a recital in the judgement 
of conviction that the accused had not legal reason to give 
why judgment should not be pronounced against him cannot 
support the contention of a trial or a hearing or an investiga-
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tion or an opportunity to be heard. "The right which an ac-
cused has to be heard on the merits is before and not after 
afte1· he is condemned." (Italics mine) Herald-Republican Pub. 
Co. vs. Lewis, supra. 
In the instant case the court found the defendant Harold 
Cook guilty of contempt without granting him any opportunity 
to be heard relative to the contempt charged. He was never 
informed of the charge against him, and at no time was he 
given an opportunity to speak until the court stated: 
"The court, having found the defendant Harold Cook 
guilty of contempt, asks counsel if defendant is prepared 
to receive the judgment of the court." (Italics mine) 
Thus, we find that the court in its judgment did not afford the 
defendant opportunitv to be heard as required by the above 
quoted section and as such constitutes reversible error. 
POINT 8. 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO SEN-
TENCE THE DEFENDANT FOR CONTEMPT ON 
THE GROUND THAT NO FINDING OF FACT OR 
CONCLUSIONS OR LAW WERE MADE OR EN-
TERED BY THE COURT AND THE SAME WERE 
NOT WAIVED BY DEFENDANT. 
In the instant case the only findings of fact entered 
relative to the contempt of the defendant are found in the 
record. None are separately made or filed herein. The record 
is very meager in its recital of the statements it holds to be con-
tempt (R. 41-42). The only reference made by the court 
is that the defendant permitted the father to take the child out 
of the jurisdiction of the court. In the Utah case of Ex parte 
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Gerber, 8-! U. 4-H, 29 P ( 2cl) 932, which was decided by this 
Court, the Court held that it was necessary that the Court 
m~~ke findings prior to any judgment of contempt, and a failure 
to do so rendered the judgment of the Court null and void. In 
the Gerber case the petitioner. Gerber. who had previously 
been committed for a contempt of court for failure to pay 
certain payments to his divorced wife, applied for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus; and. in reviewing the facts, the Court held as 
follows: 
" . . . no findings of fact were made or otherwise stated 
that the defendant had property, means, or present or 
any ability to comply with the decree or any part of the 
judgment or any order of the court with respect to 
the payment of any of the default payments, or that the 
defendant had willfully refused to pay any of such back 
installments, or that he had intentionally or otherwise 
deprived himself of ability to comply therewith nor is it 
recited or otherwise indicated that the order of con-
tempt or commitment was based on any evidence ad-
duced before the court or on which the order of con-
tempt and commitment was based. Because of the fail-
ure of the court to make findings in one or more of 
such particulars or the equivalent thereof, unless waiv-
ed, of which there is no evidence, the order or ju~g­
ment of the court adjudging the defendant guilty of 
contempt for failure to pay the installments as decreed 
and ordering him committed, as was done, has no sup-
port, and thus was rendered without jurisdiction, ancl 
is null and void . . . 
.. Such holding is to the effect, and is supported by ample 
authority, there cited, that, unless the court on a hear-
ing before it invoking jurisdiction has made and filed 
findings of fact to the effect that the defendant had 
ability or was able to comply with the decree or ord~rs 
of the court, or intentionally and contumaciously had 
deprived himself of ability to comply therewith, the 
court was without jurisdiction to commit the defendant 
as for contempt." 
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This court, in the case of State vs. Bartholomew, 85 U. 
94, 38 P. ( 2d) 753, held that findings of fact are necessary to 
support a judgment of contempt. In this case the defendant 
Bartholomew was cited in on an order to show cause supported 
by an affidavit that he had not complied with the order of 
the court requiring him to pay certain sums of money growing 
out of bastardy proceedings. The Court declared: 
"Since the ability of the defendant to comply with 
the order of the court is essential to constitute a con-
tempt, it being conceded that the order has not been 
obeyed, a consideration of certain facts to determine 
whether a contempt has been committed is necessarily re-
quired. The fact, covering the essential facts involved, 
must be made by the court in order to support a judg-
ment of contempt. 104-26-3, R. S. 1933, provides that: 
'In giving the decision the facts found and the con-
clusions of law must be separately stated, and the 
judgment mu~t thereupon be entered accordingly.' 
''This section, together with 104-26-2, has been before 
this court in numerous cases, and we have consistently 
held that 'it is the duty of the court to find upon all 
material issues raised by the pleadings, and the failurt 
to do so is reversible error. Piper vs. Eakle, 18 Utah, 
342, 2 P 2d) 909,910. It has also been held that find-
ings which are only mere conclusions such as that all 
the allegations of a complaint are true, or that defend-
ant has failed to establish a defense, or that the court 
finds for plaintiff and against defendant, are wh~lly 
insufficient to meet the requirements of the above 
statutes and cannot support a judgment. Piper vs. Eakle, 
supra; MunsBe vs. McKellar, 39 Utah, 544, 118 P. 564; 
Baker vs. Hatch, 10 Utah, 1, 257 P. 673'.'' 
Hence from the above, it is noted that the action of the 
above court, in failing to make findings as required, consti-
tuted reversible error. This is also borne out by the cases of 
Parish vs. McConkie, 84 Utah, 396, 35 P (2d) 1001; Hillyard 
vs. District Court of Cache County, supra; and \Vatson vs. 
Watson, 72 Utah, 128, 269 P. 775. 
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The statute 104-26-3 noted in the above quotation has 
been superseded by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is much more comprehensive than the fonnP-r 
section of the civil code. Rule 52 (a) in part provides as fol-
lows: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or 
with an advisory jury, the court :.hall, unless the same 
are waived, find the facts specially and state separat~ly 
its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the 
appropriate judgment; an.d in granting or refusing inter-
locutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclu:sions of law which con-
stitute the ground of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review . . . ,. (Italics mine) 
From the above it is evident that the failure to make findings 
on all the material is:mes rendered any judgment of contempt 
by the trial court against the defendant Harold Cook, null 
and void and as such constitutes reversible error. This is borne 
out by the cases of Hillyard vs. District Court of Cache Count-
ty, supra; Parish vs. McConkie, supra; State vs. Bartholomew, 
supra; and Piper vs. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P. (2d) 909. 
POINT 9. 
THE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING PUNISH-
MENT WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE CHARGE OF 
CONTEMPT AS REQUIRED BY LAW. 
Section 78-32-4 provides that no warrant of commitment 
can be issued without a previous attachment to answer or a 
notice of order to show cause. This section provides that, upon 
the filing of an affidavit with the court as contemplated by 
78-32-3, the court rna y order an attachment of the person or the 
service of an order to show cause upon the person accused of 
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contempt. (The above has reference to cases where the con-
tempt alleged is not committed in the immediate view and 
presence of the court or judge in chambers.) From the above 
it is evident that in the instant case there could be no com-
mitment by the court of the defendant, Harold Cook, for the 
alleged charge without giving him the opportunity to be heard 
relative to the charge placed against him or notice as provided 
by law. In the cases of constructive or indirect contempt, be-
fore a person can be found guilty of contempt, he must have 
due and reasonable notice of the proceeding; so ordinarily 
there should issue an attachment or an order to show cause 
why the accused should not be punished or why an attach-
ment should not issue. 
The notice required to be given a person charged with 
contempt not committed in the court's presence was held to be 
reasonable notice only where the accused has notice which will 
fairly and fully enable him to know the specific acts with 
which he i:-; charged. A statute requiring a notice of a con-
tempt proceeding to be in writing must be complied with. 17 
C.J.S. 97-99. The only notice defendant had of any charge of 
contempt was the answer of counsel for plaintiff to a direct 
question from the Court as to whether the grandparents (de-
fendants) might be guilty of contempt in allowing the child to 
go with his father after the service of the Order counsel stated, 
.. It would soom to me that they would be, because the child 
was here when they were served with an order requiring them 
to have him in court this morning." (R. 2); also at page 38 of 
the record where the court points out that the questions before 
the court are ( a ) the right to the child's custody and (b) the 
contempt. The notice mentioned and afforded the defendant 
of the charge of contempt was not sufficient nor of the dignity 
required by the statutes of this State nor did it afford the de-
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fendant sufficient time in which to prepare, or trial, present 
evidence, or answer any charges made. 
Thus, from the above it is evident that the failure of the 
trial court to give the defendant reasonable notice of the charge 
of contempt was reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the defendanf s contention that the trial court com-
mitted the fundamental errors herein assigned in that: 
1. It was without jurisdiction to award the custody of the 
child to anyone, the child being out of the jurisdiction of the 
court according to its own finding; 
2. There was no affidavit setting forth the acts constitut-
ing the contempt alleged ever filed or served upon defendant 
in order to clothe the court with jurisdiction to hear the con-
tempt charged; 
3. The record yields no evidence upon which a judgment 
or conviction of contempt can be sustained; 
4. The court's holding that defendant's failure to notify 
certain officials of the departure of the child was an attempt 
to place the defendant under an obligation to the court by 
indirection without specific instructions in relation thereto; 
5. It held that the defendant could have denied the 
natural father the right to take the child with him; 
6. The court, by providing that the defendant could purge 
himself of part of the sentence of contempt upon the per-
formance of conditions, attempted to secure the custody of the 
minor child to the plaintiff by circuity and by coercion which 
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would result in a denial of the natural father's opportunity to 
be heard; 
7. The defendant was given no opportunity to present 
answers as provided for by law; 
8. The court failed to enter findings and conclusions as 
required by law, thus rendering its judgment null and void; 
9. The defendant was not given due and proper notice 
of the charge of contempt against him prior to his conviction. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that the action of the 
trial court be reversed; that the iudgment and conviction of 
contempt against defendant be vacated and declared null and 
void; and that the award of custody to plaintiff be declared 
a nullity because of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY E. NASH, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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